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Abstract:
The RFID technology has been used by
industries in recent years, for examples, replacing the
traditional two-dimensional barcode, logistics management,
military applications, identification. In fact, RFID
technology has become one of the new killer technologies.
The RFID uses radio frequency to convey information which
involves, however, many security problems; Current RFID
guidelines do not present solutions to these security
problems. The methods put forward in published paper fail
to offer complete solutions, either. This study identifies
RFID security method for Entrance Guard system. The
algorithms used include Hash, AES, random values, XOR
four item technology, and use the three-way authentication
structure to solve the safety problems of the certification of
Entrance Guard system. The experiment showed the
algorithms provided better protection on the current RFID
systems against attack methods such as Eavesdropping,
Traceability, Spoofing and Replay attacking.

restricted, so the ability of calculation for the tag is limited
with the small capacity of the memory. Therefore, the use of
traditional encryption calculation and authentication
mechanism cannot be applied. For this reason, it is hoped to
use four technologies such as Hash, AES, Random values,
and XOR with the combination of the 3-side authentication
framework to bring up less calculation and high security
identification mechanism to RFID smart card which is
hardware restricted, for solving the security concern of the
current use of RFID smart card identification and entrance
guard system. Besides, with the difference of general
security identification mechanism, this study has been added
in active defence mechanism, for further enhancing the
security of system, and reducing the opportunity of the data
in RFID smart card to be eavesdropping,spoofing,
traceability.
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II. 1

I. Introduction
Since World War II, RFID technology which was used for
identifying enemy’s or our flights has been over 60-year
evolution. Now, in the big enterprises with over 5 billion US
dollars annual sale worldwide, 70% of them has create RFID
technology plan. This shows RFID technology has drawn
the attention from general merchandise, retail business,
government, storehouse industry, and so on, so RFID
technology has just become the application in the top class
of the new generation. Apart from being used on the
logistics management, another application of RFID is to
insert RFID tag into Smart IC card. This type of application
is quite extensive, for example, Taipei MRT pass card,
identification card of entrance security of multi-storey
buildings, work ID from government and schools, student ID,
and so forth. Through RFID wireless transmission and
features of non-contact, the original issues of inconvenience
and fabrication on the use of contact smart card. However,
due to the RFID using wireless frequency to communicate
and carry information as well, its new security issue has also
gradually appeared. In additional, the issue of RFID system
security has not yet been fully regulated in the book of
national normal standard, so this issue is quite controversial.
In this study, RFID tag frequency is 13.56MHz, and
according to ISO/IEC18000-3, it belongs to Passive Tag.
There is no place for batteries in the tag, and the size is
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Electronic Business,
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II. Background Knowledge
RFID

RFID stands for “Radio Frequency Identification” system,
and it is similar to Smart card system. It is developed due to
the defect of contact system by using radio frequency and
carrying digital data, so the identification card and card
reader do not need to contact each other but complete the
exchange of data. Consequently, there is no requirement of
direction under this way of carrying data, and the card could
be immediately identified when it is put in the bag or purse.
It’s a chip of mini two-sided radio waves with card-pasted
style, and only uses two connected point to connect one
simple IC to another antenna, so the installation of receiving
signal could be done. When the question of the
electromagnetic remote wave was sent out, the card could
right away to answer the required information by digital
radio frequency signal, while RFID is composed of 4 parts,
such as RFID tag, RFID reader, Backend database,
frequency radio.[1][2]
（1）RFID tag
It is pasted or inserted to merchandise, goods, RF chips
in smart card, and the main structure includes CLK circuit,
AC to DC commutation wave filter, demod, codec, ip,
memory.
RFID tag can be divided into two different types, active
and passive:
◎ Active Tag
With one build-in small battery, the capacity of memory
could reach 1MB, and there is longer radio communication
distance (100 meters) by using communication, but there is
limitation of deadline which is about 7 to 10 years, so the
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cost is relatively high.
◎ Passive Tag
No build-in batteries, the coil inside the tag could send
electric field out by readers to get energy. Due to the use of
electromagnetic induction, the communication distance is
short, and the cost is lower, small size, long duration with
more competitive ability, so it highly possible to become the
mainstream of market. There is a comparison between
active and passive RFID tag in table 2-1 below.
Table 2-1 The comparison of tags
Active

Passive

Power installation

Build-in

No Build-in

Valid period for use

Yes

No

Environment
Condition
Price

More
Sensitive to
high and low
temperature
higher

Can adapt
to
worse
environment
Lower

（2）RFID reader
Reading, receiving past or inserting merchandize, goods,
receiver of RF tag in the smart card. The main structure
concludes: PLL, VCO, Demod, Codec, uP, Memory, time
record generator. RFID reader can use antenna to read and
write. Different RFID system has different type of antenna.
For example, the reader in the entrance of supermarket:
because the goods carried in different height, the antenna
could be high as a person’s height. The antenna do not need
to activate tag anytime, but activate the transmission by
cooperate the sensor in the food pad. Readers can be divided
into two types: fixed and portable. The former can be place
in the entrance of the supermarket, good shelves, warehouse
entrance, wagons, container yard entrance, airport, and so on.
The latter one is much lighter, with direction and shorter
distance of interaction.

country. Every country uses different frequency. Generally
speaking, the information transmission and communication
frequency between FR readers with low frequency and RF
tag are not controlled by government, but the ultra high
frequency would be restricted. Take Japanese government
as an example, the frequency of 950~960 MHz has been
decided to open for RFID system to use. RFID system
could be categorized by frequency into four: Low Frequency
(LF,125KHz ~ 135 KHz), High Frequency (HF,13.56
MHz),Ultra High Frequency (UHF , 100MHz~960MHz),
Microwave(over 1GHz).
II. 2 RFID Security Issue
RFID system carry information by wireless, so if RFID
system does not provide complete security mechanism, then
within the available range of information transmission, the
attackers can randomly access, falsify, delete, and damage
the information of RFID tag. This weakness has obviously
threatened the organization, enterprises, personal
information security and privacy. In the following text, the
weakness of RFID used by attackers and may cause security
problem attackers will be indicated.
A. Eavesdropping
Because RFID system uses wireless to transmit information
and communication, the attackers could eavesdrop the
information and message during the communication between
reader and tag. So the way of this type of attack is called
“Eavesdropping”. In the transmission of RFID system, it can
be roughly divided into reader-to-tag(forward channel)
and tag- to-reader(backward channel). Forward channel
came from reader, so the distance is long and the range is big
(100meter), so it is easily to be eavesdropped without being
noticed easily. Backward channel came from tag, so the
distance is short, and the range is smaller, so it’s more
difficult to be eavesdropped without being noticed easily. As
Figure 2-1 shown:

（3）Back-end database
The main function is to record details of the RF tag,
when the reader received RF tag signal, it will link either by
wireless or wire network to back-end database, to get the
integration of details of RF tag for other application to use.
（4）Frequency radio
The frequency of RFID is to link the information
transmission between tag and card readers. The frequency is
sent from card readers out to tag, and the tag returns the
information inside the tag. The option of frequency is mainly
based on the distance between RF reader and RF tag. A
lower frequency means a lower range of reading, and slower
information transmission. But in the metal and humid
environment, high frequency relatively has better reading
ability. Besides, it depends on the frequency opened by each

Figure 2-1 Forward、Backward range

The security issue of eavesdropping will cause two
serious damages: the exposedness of personal information
and business spy.
(1) The exposedness of personal information
In the aspect of the exposedness of personal information,
this has been widely used in RFID smart card which save
card holder's personal information. For example, health
insurance card stores medical record, personal information,
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and so on. For they are the information that card holder
would not want to make known to the public, and necessary
to be protected. However, because RFID system belongs to
non-contact card, so the opportunity of being exposed is
relatively higher.
(2) Business spy behavior
Nowadays, the industry of manufacture, logistics, retail, and
military institute give every effort to popularize the use of
RFID system, and RFID relatively brings quite a lot of
benefit, convenience. However, under the tendency of RFID,
the issue hidden behind would be monitored by attackers,
the risk of being stole on information. RFID system could
make the factory owners use the information stored in the
tag memory to quickly get product name, model number,
material, logistics procedure, and so on; on the contrary, the
attackers could also get and monitor the product information
in the same way. Therefore, the activity of business spy
would become worse, and then lead to serious consequence
if there is no further prevention of security mechanism.
B. Traceability
In RFID system, RFID reader could get the information and
trace product through the returned message RF tag. It is
also this feature that attackers could trace product and users
through the returned message from FR tag, so it is called
“Traceability”. The main reason that attackers could trace
tag is because normally the returned value from tag is fixed
and unchanged. Some tag returns UID value directly, and
this UID is also the unique identification value of RF tag.
Therefore, attackers only have to set readers in many fixed
point, then they could trace products and users. For example,
sneaker factory owners want to carry out logistics and
storehouse management, so they insert RF tag chip into
shoes, and when customer A bought this shoes, then
attackers could trace the customer A through the fixed RFID
reader and make customer A’s privacy public.
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example, they could forge IC card of entrance to invade
company or military institute.
II. 3

RFID Existing Security Strategy

The solution of this RFID security issue could be divided
into two categories: Non-Cryptographic Scheme and
Cryptographic Scheme. There will be a brief description of
several important solution: “Kill tag approach” in “nonCrypto-graphic scheme” and Hash based access control,
Randomized access control, Hash chain in “cryptographic
scheme”. [3][4][5][6][7][8]
A. Kill tag approach
In order to prevent the occurrence of security issue when
users get RF tag, the solution is to delete its memory
information before they get it. The way is to put one 8-bit
password in every RF tag, and then run “Kill” command.
However, there are two problems existing in “Kill tag
approach”. One is the support from the manufacturing
factory is required, and the other one is that to ensure the
Kill command has been actually executed is difficult.
B. Rewriteable memory
Separating memory in RF tag into ROM and RAM,
ROM can store public information, and RAM can store
private information. Readers have to be authenticated
before accessing RAM, with the implement of cryptographic
scheme.
C. Hash based access control
Irreversibility of Hash is mainly to be used for
authentication. Its structure is as Figure 2-2 shown:

C. Spoofing
After the introduction of two security RFID issues of
eavesdropping and trace, another issue is “Spoofing” which
includes two major items: Theft and Counterfeiting.
（1）Theft
Through deceiving legal RF tag, attackers could deceive
automatic book close system, entrance guard security system
by RFID system features. For example, attackers could
rewrite RF tag information or replace the RF tag information
inside expensive goods with that inside the cheaper ones.
Or attackers could falsify a host of RF tag to mess up the
whole management of the supply chain.
（2）Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting is defined as can be read or intercepted to
falsify the information of RF tag. Attackers could deceive
RFID system through falsifying RF tag information. For

Figure 2-2 Hash based access control

In RF tag, metaID (metaID = has (key)) will be stored
firstly. When readers query RF tag, RF tag would return
metaID, and reader can search the back database to find the
matched key value to complete authentication.
This
method could solve the problem of RF tag information being
eavesdropped, but because the returned metaID value from
RF tag is fixed, so it cannot prevent attacker’s trace.
D. Randomized access control
This method is used to improve the issue of Hash based
access control to be traced. Adding one random value R in
the returned value, so the returned value that reader queried
could be changed. Its returned value is {R ,h( IDk || R)}and
the structure is as followed in Figure 2-3:
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Figure2-3 Randomized access control

E. Hash chain
In RF tag, storing on initial value s(s1), and the way of
communication with readers is similar. Only the returned
value changed to ai = G(si), and after responding to readers,
it would immediately changed to si+1=H(si) where G、H are
hash function. Its structure is as followed in Figure 2-4:

The RFID smart IC card discussed in this research is the
RF tag with frequency at 13.56Mhz. So the standard from
ISO / IEC 18000 specifications should be followed. As a
result, there will be some limitations for the hardware. In
this research, we will embed a hash calculator, random
generator and several logic gates in the RF tag, which will
not violate the hardware limitation rules from the
specifications. Before introducing the system structure
flowchart, we can define the database structure saved inside
the RF tag and security system database. {S_ count , Key
num , Pk (Data)} is the database structure in RF tag. S_ count
records the scan counts for this RFID smart IC card by RFID
reader. K num is the identification serial number of the user
data encryption key in this RFID smart IC card. Pk (Data) is
the encryption code of card holder information encrypted by
the K num key. There are {K num ,Keyi} and {ID , S_C_count}
in the structure of security system database, in which Keyi is
one of the key used in system encryption, K num is the
corresponding identification serial number for Keyi, ID is
the user identification code and S_C_count is the
identification number of times between the record system
and card holder. The system data structure is depicted as
Figure 3-2 in below.

Figure 2-4 Hash chain

III.

System Structure

III. 1

System Introduction

In current entrance guard systems, most of them use RFID
smart card for user identification. This RFID technology
gives the convenience and speed for identification check but
this convenience also relatively generates the security issues.
In this research, we provides a symmetrical encryption
method (AES, HASH, Random value) and three-sides
identification in the entrance guard security system structure
of RFID smart IC card. This system structure not only
protects the user information privacy, counterfeit prevention,
and identity theft, but also protects the card holder to be
traced. Besides, different from other security system
structure with focus on the passive security shield, this
system also provides active detection for smart IC Card
security. After the card is attacked, the system will
automatically turn on the reaction procedure to increase the
security level on information and privacy protection. The
system structure is depicted as Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1 System Framework

Figure.3-2 Data Structure

System flow
Here we will categorize in nine steps to explain the
system flow structure from Fig3-1.
(1) When the card holder use RFID smart card to precede the
identity confirmation, RFID reader will generate question
message to the RFID smart card after the card holder puts
the card within the save and read range of RFID reader.
This question message includes Rr value, which is a 128bit
random value generated by the reader.
(2) When RFID smart IC card is inside the reader sensor
region, it will add the S_count value in the RF tag by the
power from electromagnetic induction. Then it will generate
α message as reply from the equation α={Ft(K num , Rr)||
Rt}. Ft is a hash function embedded inside the tag and Rt is
the random number generated by the random code generator.
The transfer format of question message from RFID reader
and α message replied by IC card will use the standard of
communication structure defined in ISO/IEC 18000-3
specification book, as illustrated in Figure3-3 and Figure3-4.
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III. 2

Figure 3-3 Query message

Security Analysis

In the second chapter, we have discussed the security
problems in the RFID system. In this section, we will do the
security analysis for the security identification process from
the security problem in the RFID system in order to proof
the security structure in this system. In this research, we
assume that RFID reader, backend data transfer and
communication are all inside a safe environment. Therefore,
the research will not cover the discussion in security topics
in RFID reader and backend data transfer connection line.
A. Eavesdrop

Figure 3-4αmessage

(3) RFID reader gets the α value and sends it back to the
backend system for identification comparison.
(4) Security system searches the saved K num in the backend
database then it will compares Fr(K j , Rr) and α value.
(5)The system will send the Key i and K i, which are
generated from the IC card of the card holder, back to the
system. After full search in all K num, the system will send
back error message if it cannot find the matched K i.
(6) RFID reader will send βmessage in order to get the card
holder information from RFID smart IC card, in which
β=Fr(K i , Rt).
(7) After RF tag confirms β message, it will try to compare
to see if Ki and K num are the same.
(8) Make sure β message is correct, feedback ε from ε=( P k
(Data) || S_count) ⊕ Ft(Rr).
(9) RFID reader will process the identification procedure
though the Key i、Rr、S_C_count value from the card
holder. The identification process will get P k (Data) ||
S_count from Fr(Rr) ⊕ε and then use the key to get the
value of P k (Data).
The 9 steps in above is the passive mode processing
steps for security identification system. However, we also
mentioned the active mode security identification system.
The procedure will be addressed in below. According to the
real needs, the system will define two security entrance
guard values (T1 and T2). From the security identification
step (9), the security system will get the S_count value from
the εmessage. After the calculation of S_count and
S_C_count difference value (n), it will compare the n value
with the entrance guard value defined by the system. If n is
larger than T1, the system will warn the card holder and
inform that the card might be attacked. If n is larger than T2,
the system will lock this RFID smart IC card and request the
card holder to activate the card from the IT department. The
security system administrator will use different key for
encryption and change Knum value for card holder’s personal
information. By this method, the system will be able to
perform the active security shield to enhance the security in
the identification system.

From the transfer structure inside this system, the data
transfer (See Fig 3-1, step 8) in this identification process of
RFID smart IC card and RFID reader (See Fig 3-1, step 1, 2
and 7) is protected from the hash function encryption. The
hash function contains irreversibility which means that the
attacker could not reproduce the original message even
though thos message was eavesdropped by the attacker.
Besides, two random numbers (Rr and Rt) are used in this
identification process which offers different message for
each identification process to increase the difficulty of force
methods by the attacker. During the information
transmission from the card holder, the system will send the
information after the data process with Ft(Rr) in xor
calculation. The card holder’s information was encrypted
and saved in the RF tag memory. Though the attacker uses
the stole Rr value to calculate Ft(Rr) value and crack the xor
calculation protection, the cost and time will be increased for
attacker to crack and get the encrypted P k (Data) based on
several different encryption key used by the system. For
example, it will cost 2128 to crack the information from
128bits key with AES encrypted calculation. If the key
number is 25 , the cost will increase to 2640 for crack.
Therefore, the attacker will not be able to steal the P k (Data)
value to solve the private information from the card holder.
B. Spoofing
In the entrance guard security system, the reproduction
and theft of identification IC Card is a serious security topic.
In this system, the attacker is able to get the P k (Data||
S_count) xor Ft(Rr) value by eavesdrop. If the attacker is
able to analyze the interpreted P k (Data) value to reproduce
IC Card and deceive the security system, the identification
procedure is required before the personal information check
by the security system. At this time, the attacker must also
hold this K num value of the RFID smart IC card together to
pass the identification procedure to the check process.
However, the K num value will be encrypted with hash
function and random value in the transfer process. The
attacker will not be able to get the K num value by eavesdrop
and to reach the goal of deceiving ssytem with P k (Data)
value.
C. Traceability
In traditional RFID system, the attacker could trace the
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card holder from the fixed replied message from the attacker
reader’s quote only by couple fix location RFID reader via
the RF tag chip embedded inside the card holder’s RFID
smart IC card. In the security system discussed in this
research, the message value from each communication
transfer between the whole RF tag and RFID reader is not a
fixed value due to the extra embedded hash calculator and
random value generator inside the RF tag (See Fig 3-1, Step
1, 2, 4, 7, and 8). Therefore, the attacker will not be able to
trace RF tag from the fix reply message.
D.

Man-in-the middle attack

If the attack is sent after reproduction of legally obtained
RFID reader and RF tag message, the attacker could get ( P k
(Data) || S_count) ⊕ Ft(Rr) value after performing Man-inthe middle attack. However, the attacker still encounters the
same difficulty in the spoofing attack as discribed above.
The attacker has to cract two encryption procedure to obtain
the card holder private information. So this security system
structure is able to prevent Man-in-the middle attack.
E. Replay attack
If the identification is not passed either in security
system side or RF tag side, the system will stop the reply
message immediately. Besides, the system uses two random
numbers and active security shield mode so that resending
attack is not able to attack the system.

issue in transfer and communication failure between RFID
smart IC card and RFID reader, such as the high humidity in
the rainy days or RFID smart IC card was placed inside the
metallic box etc. Therefore, two entrance guard values are
used to prevent these unexpectable reasons from the
inconvenience of frequent changing card information.

IV.

Conclusion

The development of RFID technology brings significant
convenience to people but its security is also a big drawback.
Without providing solutions, it will seriously affect the
information security from personnel, company, military to
government. This research provides an identification system
for RFID smart card entrance guard system with Hash, AES,
Random values and XOR technologies. Combined the
identification from three sides, the goal is to resolve the
security issues for RFID smart card, such as eavesdrop,
traceability and counterfeit etc. In addition, the embedded
RF tag hardware also meets ISO/IEO 18000-3 standard to
proof the execution posibility. Besides, the active shield
system was added in the structure to enhance the strength of
the security systems to prevent the potential danger of
system failuer from the attacker by resending attacks or Dos
attacks to the system.
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